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This study examines the risk-subsidy, monitoring and ownership structure hypotheses in rela-
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American model, Chinese insurance guaranty funds possess the following distinct features: pre-
assessment, separate accumulation and partial responsibility for peer bankruptcy. We ﬁnd that
the risks of insurance ﬁrms decline following the establishment of guaranty funds. Pre-assess
ment provides a limited risk incentive to insurers and one that is easily offset by stakeholder
monitoring. In terms of the ownership structure hypothesis, we ﬁnd that foreign insurers are
more risk-driven than their state-controlled counterparts. Our ﬁndings have implications for
countries striving to lessen the adverse effect of guaranty funds as well as for the improvement
of insurance regulation policy in China.
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Introduction
As a safety net for policyholders, guaranty funds play a vital role in protecting policyholders
when insurers become insolvent. It has been reported that over US$56 billion were paid out in
claims during the period 2001–2004 in the U.S.1 Guaranty funds can be viewed as providing a
put option on the value of the insurer’s assets with a strike price equal to the value of the
policies.2 The institutional details of guaranty funds (e.g. coverage level, funding and premium
systems) have the potential to create competing incentives for risk taking by insurers. Lee et al.3
ﬁrst proposed the risk-subsidy and monitoring hypotheses for the establishment of guaranty
funds. Their evidence shows that the risk to an insurer’s asset portfolio increases after the
enactment of a guaranty fund, and the increase in risk is signiﬁcant only for stock insurers.
Downs and Sommer4 support the risk-subsidy hypothesis and demonstrate a relationship
1 National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds (2011).
2 Merton (1977).
3 Lee et al. (1997).
4 Downs and Sommer (1999).
between insider ownership and risk taking. These empirical results were obtained in the context
of American insurance guaranty funds. American insurance guaranty funds are characterised by
risk neutrality and incorporate a post-insolvency assessment mechanism,5 which is considered to
be essential for risk taking.
One solution to this problem could be to replace the current ﬂat-rate guaranty fund charges
with risk-based premiums, as suggested by Cummins.6 This would force insurers to bear the
cost of their risk taking, even in the absence of market penalties for risk.7 However, few
American guaranty fund associations have adopted this strategy.
In theory, pre-assessment is another way to mitigate the risk-subsidy incentive for insurers.
In this scenario, an insolvent insurer has to pay part or even all of its bills from its ex ante
accumulated guaranty fund. How does a guaranty fund with a pre-assessment mechanism
perform in mitigating the risk incentive? As far as we know, no empirical study has yet examined
this question. If a nation-speciﬁc empirical study shows that guaranty funds with pre-assessment
are effective in reducing risk taking by insurers, and hence, that pre-assessment increases the
efﬁciency of guaranty funds, this approach would become of interest to other nations.
Accordingly, this study tests the effect of a pre-insolvency assessment mechanism on risk
taking, based on evidence from China. Chinese guaranty funds are characterised by pre-
assessment and insurers taking partial responsibility for their bankrupt peers. We investigate
whether the risk-subsidy incentive could be low enough to be offset by a monitoring
incentive in guaranty funds with ex ante assessment. Secondly, we aim to further examine
the ownership hypothesis by investigating whether there is any difference in the effect of
guaranty funds on risk taking between state-controlled and foreign insurers. The former face
some distinct governance challenges, such as politically motivated ownership interference, a
complex chain of agents and so on. Meanwhile, it is often deemed that state-controlled
insurers are protected from takeover and bankruptcy. Does the discrepancy in governance
structures result in a difference in the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking?
Our study is original in two ways. Firstly, we believe we are the ﬁrst to examine the effect of a
guaranty fund with ex ante assessment on risk taking by insurers. Secondly, we use the difference
in difference (DID) model to investigate the difference in the effect of guaranty funds between
state-controlled and foreign insurers. DID is a quasi-experimental technique that measures the
within-subject pre- and post-treatment difference between the treatment and control groups. To the
best of our knowledge, no other study of guaranty funds has adopted this method. Our ﬁndings
have implications for countries striving to lessen adverse effects by adjusting the institutional
details of guaranty funds as well as for the improvement of insurance regulation policy in China.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The background and hypothetical
development are introduced in the third section after a literature review in the next section;
the latter section discusses the methodology and data; the conclusions are then set out in the
ﬁnal section following the presentation of the empirical results in the penultimate section.
5 According to the U.S. guaranty fund system, New York is the only state that has a pre-assessment guaranty fund
based on the insurer’s premium income in New York. It requires insurers to contribute to a permanent insolvency
fund. All other states that have guaranty fund laws have post-assessment vehicles. There is a signiﬁcant
difference between Chinese guaranty funds and American guaranty funds with one exception. Therefore, the
American guaranty funds compared in this study concern those established in states other than New York.
6 Cummins (1988).
7 Downs and Sommer (1999).
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Review
Guaranty funds can be viewed as providing a put option on the value of an insurer’s assets
with a strike price equal to the value of the insurance policies.2 It is argued that they
provide risk-taking incentives for insurers and so may threaten the stability of the whole
industry. However, proponents of guaranty funds argue that they are structured speciﬁcally
to provide incentives for sound insurance companies to monitor their competitors and
report unsafe practices to state regulators. They also suggest that such peer monitoring is
more effective and can offset risk-taking incentives for insurers.
The empirical evidence for the impact of guaranty funds on insurers’ risk taking and the
potential for the fragility of the insurance sector is mixed. The three most-frequently cited
studies all focus on American insurance guaranty funds. Munch and Smallwood8 examine
insolvencies among property liability (PL) insurers around the establishment of the guaranty
funds. They ﬁnd evidence consistent with the monitoring hypothesis that guaranty funds
operations have reduced insolvencies. Lee et al.3 also examine changes in PL insurers’ risk
taking around the enactment of state guaranty fund laws. However, their evidence shows that
the risks of insurers’ asset portfolios increase following enactment. Moreover, they propose
the ownership structure hypothesis, which suggests that managers of stock insurance ﬁrms
have stronger incentives to increase asset risk than managers of mutuals since the latter
bundle ownership claims with their insurance policies. They also ﬁnd evidence that the risk
increase for stock insurers is higher than that of mutuals.
Downs and Sommer4 further examine the competing effects of the risk-subsidy and moni-
toring hypotheses for stock insurers. Agency theory proposes that managers of ﬁrms will
often act in their own interests rather than those of shareholders, for the long-term value of
the nondiversiﬁable, ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital of managers may be maximised by ensuring
ﬁrm survival rather than seeking to maximise value. One of the ways to reduce the conﬂict
between ﬁrm owners and managers is by giving the latter an ownership stake, since this
aligns their mutual interests more closely. Downs and Sommer4 suggest that the implicit put
option created by guaranty funds would beneﬁt the stockholders of PL insurers as well as
managers with an ownership interest. Their empirical results support the risk-subsidy
hypothesis and demonstrate the essential link between insider ownership and risk taking.
Moreover, the extent to which managers engage in risk taking may depend on how well their
interests are aligned with those of the owners.
American insurance guaranty funds are characterised by a ﬂat rate and an ex post
assessment system, both of which are deemed essential risk-taking incentives for insurers.
Chinese insurance guaranty funds are pre-assessed, which is similar to the deposit insurance
system in many countries.9 The availability of ex ante funding may ensure faster payout,
provide greater reassurance to policyholders about the guaranty fund’s ability to meet its
commitments, help avoid the procyclicality arising from raising premiums for surviving
8 Munch and Smallwood (1980).
9 Among Financial Stability Board (FSB) member jurisdictions with an explicit deposit insurance system, a
considerable number (16 countries) have built up an ex ante fund in response to a growing trend in funding
patterns around the world. Five jurisdictions (Australia, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K.) are
presently supported solely by an ex post funding system, although the Netherlands shifted to an ex ante system in
2012, and Italy and the United Kingdom are actively considering this option (Financial Stability Board, 2012).
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insurers following an insurer failure, and contribute to fairness by imposing a cost burden on
a failed insurer. On the other hand, ex ante funding implies the higher administrative costs
associated with the collection of premiums and fund management.
Theoretically, ex ante assessment would also mitigate the risk-taking incentives for
ﬁnancial institutions such as banks. Many studies have looked at the effect of deposit
insurance with ex ante funding on banks’ risk taking. For example, Wheelock and Wilson10
and Alston et al.11 ﬁnd no relationship between historical U.S. bank failure rates and deposit
insurance. Karels and McClatchey12 also ﬁnd no evidence that the adoption of deposit
insurance has increased the risk taking of U.S. credit unions. However, Gropp and Vesala13
show that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance in the European Union (EU)
may have signiﬁcantly reduced banks’ risk taking. Conversely, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache,14 looking at a sample of 61 countries, ﬁnd that, from 1980 to 1997, the
adoption of deposit insurance signiﬁcantly increased the probability of a banking crisis in the
country. Penas and Ioannidou15 compare the risk-taking effect of ambiguous implicit
guarantees and explicit deposit insurance in conditions of ﬂat insurance premiums and
partial coverage for all depositors. They ﬁnd that during the post-deposit insurance period,
banks are more likely to initiate loans they know are riskier (i.e. loans with worse internal
ratings at origination). Angkinand and Wihlborg16 study the relationship between the risk-
taking behaviour and governance of banks following the establishment of deposit insurance.
Their results show that the U-shaped relationship between their proxies for risk taking and
explicit deposit insurance coverage is robust when governance variables are introduced.
State ownership and shareholder rights seem to have a signiﬁcant effect on risk taking
through market discipline, while foreign ownership does not.
Studies on the insurance industry show that governance structure is essential to risk taking
by insurers. Ho et al.17 examine the impact of organisational structure and board composition
on risk taking in the U.S. property casualty insurance industry. They ﬁnd that some board
composition variables not only have an impact on risk-taking behaviours but also affect
particular risk measures differently. Cheng et al.18 investigate the relationship between the
risk taking by life and health (LH) insurers and the stability of their institutional ownership
using a simultaneous equation system model, and ﬁnd that stable institutional ownership is
associated with lower total risk.
Empirical evidence for the impact of deposit insurance (or a guaranty fund) on ﬁnancial
institutions (bank or insurer) risk taking is mixed. The design of the deposit insurance
(or guaranty fund) scheme and the institutional framework has attracted increasing interest
from researchers in recent years. Our study provides insight into the practical effect of pre-
assessment , a topic not so far examined in the ﬁeld of guaranty fund studies. Moreover, our
10 Wheelock and Wilson (1995).
11 Alston et al. (1994).
12 Karels and McClatchey (1999).
13 Gropp and Vesala (2004).
14 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002).
15 Penas and Ioannidou (2008).
16 Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010).
17 Ho et al. (2013).
18 Cheng et al. (2011).
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investigation of the relationship between government shareholding and the effect of guaranty
funds on risk taking will help to improve guaranty fund policy and operations.
Background and hypothesis development
Implicit and explicit Chinese guaranty funds
Over the past two decades, the Chinese insurance industry has undergone the process of
reform from a planned to a market-oriented economy. With China’s admission to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the insurance industry was opened up still further to
foreign companies. The removal of regional and business restrictions created an equally
competitive environment for both domestic and foreign insurers. In order to seize market
share, domestic insurance companies adopted a “volume expansion” strategy that resulted in
severe problems.19,20 In the meantime, state-owned insurance companies went through a
corporatisation reform and began to be more focused than before on proﬁtability.
In order to enhance the role of market discipline and facilitate an effective exit mechanism,
the Chinese Guaranty Fund Regulation was enacted in 2004 and came into force in 2005.21
According to the Insurance Law (1995), Chinese guaranty funds had been established in
1995. However, during the period from 1995 to 2004, no explicit guaranty funds were
established, although every insurer in business in China was required to collect a special
reserve which was referred to as a “guaranty fund”. Insurers held this collection within their
own companies and no details were given about the recovery of policyholders’ claims, such
as eligibility, beneﬁt cap or the assurance that the reserve would be available and sufﬁcient in
case of insurer failure.
The absence of such explicit guarantees led to strong expectations that the government and
regulators would respond by issuing blanket guarantees for all policyholders or by bailing
them out if an insurance company became ﬁnancially troubled or was no longer able to
uphold its end of the bargain. Such expectations turned into a belief, prevalent among
domestic insurers and their customers (even those who were government ofﬁcials), that the
19 Sun (2003).
20 While total premiums experienced rapid growth, severe problems also arose; low per capita productivity, high
operations costs, imprudent risk taking, insufﬁcient capital, lack of innovation, shortage of professional
personnel, consumer distrust and reputational damage. In addition, insurance personnel have been trained to
compete for market share and premium volume only. They often do not consider service, innovation or
proﬁtability.
21 The Amendment of the Guaranty Fund Regulations was enacted in 2008. The trigger for this was the use of
guaranty funds by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) to save the New China Life Insurance
Company (NCI). The chairman of NCI had misappropriated over 13 billion yuan of company funds to his
interest-related partners to enable them to purchase NCI shares and keep control of the company. In 2006, in
order to improve the corporate governance of NCI, CIRC decided to purchase NCI shares from those interest-
related partners by using the guaranty fund. Thus, the Insurance Guaranty Fund held 38.8 per cent of NCI shares
and became the biggest shareholder. This event aroused heated nationwide discussion over whether or not the
purpose of the guaranty fund was to protect policyholders’ interest or to save an insurer, and whether it was
legitimate for CIRC as a government department to have intervened in this manner with a private company. One
of the main amendments to the regulations was the establishment of the China Insurance Security Fund
Corporation in 2008 to take charge of guaranty funds.
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government would ultimately take responsibility for keeping insurers sound. From this
perspective, Chinese domestic insurers and policyholders had the protection of an implicit
guaranty fund.
Following the establishment of an explicit guaranty fund, all policyholders are now
protected, whether their underwriting company is domestic or foreign. Chinese guaranty
funds have some of the same features as those in other countries, such as a beneﬁt cap for
policyholders, ﬂat-rate assessment, and the exclusion of reinsurance and overseas business.
However, compared to the American model, Chinese guaranty funds have the following
special features: (1) pre-assessment: The guaranty fund of each insurance ﬁrm operating in
China is pre-assessed by the China Insurance Security Fund Corporation; (2) the guaranty
funds collected from each insurer are not pooled before use, so funds are accumulated under
a nominal account for each insurer and ﬁrms can suspend their responsibility for collection
when the accumulation reaches 6 per cent of their total asset base; and (3) partial
responsibility for peer bankruptcy: when an insurer gets into ﬁnancial trouble or goes
bankrupt, policyholders’ outstanding claims are ﬁrst recovered from the funds accumulated
in its nominal account. If this does not achieve full recovery, peers are then responsible for
the shortfall, based on their percentage of market share.
It is proposed that the discrepancies between the institutional details of guaranty funds and
the structure of the insurance industry will result in the funds having different effects on risk
taking by insurers.
Hypothesis development
In the Chinese guaranty funds, the ﬂat-rate assessment system means insurers with lower
risks collect more funds, relative to their real risks, and vice versa for higher-risk insurers.
A ﬂat-rate assessment therefore provides a risk incentive to insurance companies. On the
other hand, the requirement to share responsibility for peer bankruptcy and the pre-
assessment system are both supposed to weaken the risk-taking incentive compared to
American guaranty funds. The ex ante funding system and the separate fund accumulation
means each insurer has to shoulder all or at least most of the cost of excessive risk. With the
decline in the implicit put option value of guaranty funds, the risk-taking incentive for
insurance companies decreases. Therefore, the risk incentive of the Chinese guaranty funds
exists in theory, but is limited in practice.
In terms of monitoring incentives, Lee et al.3 consider these to be much less than stated in
American guaranty funds for regulators, competitors and customers. We assume the
monitoring incentive for the Chinese guaranty funds will be weak based on their institutional
properties. Firstly, monitoring by peer companies would not be effectively stimulated after
the establishment of explicit guaranty funds because of the partial responsibility requirement
and the standard free-rider problems. Secondly, monitoring by policyholders will be limited
for two reasons: (1) policyholders are adequately protected by the Insurance Law when an
insurer goes bankrupt22 and (2) limited public awareness of the issues and restricted access to
22 It is stipulated in the Insurance Law that, when an insurer goes into liquidation, policyholders are second in line
to receive satisfaction and their outstanding claims must be recovered from the liquidation assets. Furthermore,
when a life insurance company gets into ﬁnancial trouble, all pending liability and outstanding claims will be
taken over by another life insurer.
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information prevent policyholders from monitoring insurers effectively. Nowadays, most
individual Chinese policyholders have no real idea about guaranty funds. It is also hard for
them to obtain the information necessary to conduct monitoring because Chinese insurance
ﬁrms, with the exception of a few listed companies, are not required to disclose information
timeously or regularly to the public. As for monitoring from regulators, the establishment of
guaranty funds may stimulate them to pay more attention to insurers, especially the bigger
companies. However, as a whole, the monitoring incentives for regulators, competing
insurers and customers are likely to be weak.
What is the net effect of the risk-subsidy incentive and monitoring following the
establishment of Chinese guaranty funds, since both are theoretically weak? Is the risk-
taking incentive weak enough to be offset by monitoring by stakeholders and regulators? We
propose the following two hypotheses.
H1: The net effect of the establishment of explicit Chinese guaranty funds on risk taking by
insurers will be a risk incentive.
H2: The net effect of the establishment of explicit Chinese guaranty funds on risk taking by
insurers will be a monitoring incentive when monitoring from stakeholders
dominates.
Next, we investigate the relationship between risk taking and ownership structure
following the establishment of guaranty funds. The ownership identities of insurance ﬁrms
can be classiﬁed into two groups: state-controlled and foreign. We deﬁne domestic insurers
controlled by the state by means of full, majority or signiﬁcant minority ownership as state-
controlled insurers, and all others as foreign insurers. Chinese governments throughout the
years have directly or indirectly invested in most of the current domestic insurance
companies. In practice, the China Investment Corporation, local government, the State Asset
Management Bureau, government bureaux and state-owned enterprises are the most
common investors in domestic insurers.
Risk-taking strategies differ between state-controlled and foreign insurers due to the
discrepancy in governance structures. State-controlled insurers have faced some distinctive
governance challenges. Firstly, they have suffered from excessive hands-on, politically
motivated interference from owners. Their risk strategy is therefore determined not only
by the market but also by political objectives. The multiple and sometimes contradictory
objectives of state ownership result in the state intervening excessively in matters or decisions
which should be left to the company and its own governance entities.23 Secondly, state-
controlled insurers involve a complex chain of agents (management, board, ownership entities,
ministries and the government) with a lack of clearly and easily identiﬁable principals. This
makes it difﬁcult to evaluate their performance and impose accountability.24,25
23 For example, Chinese government ofﬁcials are appointed as senior managers of state-controlled insurers and
supervised by the Organisation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
Ensuring the realisation of the objectives speciﬁed by government investors would maximise the long-term
value of the nondiversiﬁable human capital.
24 To structure this complex web of accountabilities in order to ensure efﬁcient decisions and good corporate
governance in state-controlled insurers is a challenge (OECD, 2005).
25 OECD (2005).
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On the other hand, it is often said that state-controlled insurers are protected from two of
the major threats to private sector corporations, namely takeover and bankruptcy. A guaranty
fund as a put option has less value to a state-controlled insurer than to a foreign company.
State-controlled insurers are therefore likely to have little risk incentive following the
establishment of explicit guaranty funds.
Meanwhile, foreign insurers have suffered from tough competition for market share and face
certain disadvantages, such as having fewer branches and being less well known to the public.
Accordingly, they have to use more risky strategies to seize market share. The establishment of
explicit guaranty funds provides some protection against such risk taking. Therefore, foreign
insurers are likely to be more affected by the establishment of guaranty funds.
We propose the following hypothesis regarding the effect of explicit guaranty funds on
risk taking by insurers on the basis of ownership structure.
H3: With the establishment of explicit guaranty funds, foreign insurers would be more
risk-driven than state-controlled insurers.
That is, risk taking by foreign insurers will decrease by less than that of state-controlled
insurers if the net effect of a guaranty fund is to increase monitoring, and foreign insurers
will take more risks than state-controlled ﬁrms if the net effect of guaranty funds is to create a
risk incentive.
Methodology and data
Explicit guaranty funds and risk taking
This study examines the net effect of establishing Chinese guaranty funds on risk taking by
insurers and the difference in any such effect between state-controlled and foreign insurers.
Risk taking by insurers is affected by two important factors. One is the characteristics of the
individual company such as size, age, risk preference and premium growth; the other is the
macroeconomic environment, in terms of factors such as the growth of the economy and
market concentration. These factors are used as control variables in our regression models.
Large insurance ﬁrms are expected to exhibit lower risks for several reasons.26,27On the
other hand, if ﬁnancial institutions are perceived as “too big to fail”, their risk taking might
not be affected by guaranty funds or a deposit fund arrangement, as they enjoy a
comprehensive safety net regardless.28 We use the total assets of an insurance company as
a proxy for ﬁrm size and the natural logarithm of the asset base as the size variable.
26 Cheng et al. (2011).
27 Firstly, they have greater access to derivatives markets for hedging and other risk-taking strategies and may be
able to hedge at a lower cost due to their scale. Secondly, they have stronger incentives to protect their franchise
values and to maintain their reputation for safety, because this enables them to market products such as
guarantee services (e.g. performance bond guarantees, default guarantees for commercial papers and municipal
revenue bonds (standby letters of credit)) and to price their products more favourably. Thirdly, investors may
believe that regulators are unwilling to let larger insurers fail, in which case, the value of the implicit guaranty
fund option increases with insurer size. This is similar to the notion of being “too big to fail” in the banking
industry.
28 Gropp and Vesala (2004).
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Firm age reﬂects an insurance company’s ability to survive. For example, startups are
prone to fail. Insurance companies with a long history are assumed to be more sophisticated
at dealing with difﬁcult market conditions and to be able to sustain stable growth through
hard times.
Risk preference is determinative of insurers’ risk strategy. A relatively conservative
company will prefer to diversify in terms of products and geographic areas, as well as to
carry a high level of reinsurance. Reinsurance as a conventional means of risk management
creates a manageable and proﬁtable portfolio of insured risks and makes the company’s
results more predictable. The variables used as proxies for insurers’ risk preference in our
models include the business line Herﬁndahl index, geographic Herﬁndahl index and the
reinsurance ratio. The percentage of long-tail product lines is also used to capture PL
insurers’ risk preference.
BHHIit (the business line Herﬁndahl index) measures the line concentration and indicates
the level of risk taking. It is deﬁned as ∑(PWi/TPW)2, where PWi is the value of the net
written premiums in line i and TPW is the insurer’s total net written premiums. GHHIit (the
geographic Herﬁndahl index) is a measure of geographic concentration and is deﬁned as
∑(PWi/TPW)2, where PWi is the value of net written premiums in province i , and TPW is the
insurer’s total net written premiums. LONGTAILit (percentage of long-tail lines) is calculated
by the premiums of long-tail lines divided by total net written premiums. RRit (the
reinsurance ratio) is measured as the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct
premiums written plus reinsurance assumed.17
The macroeconomy has been found to be a key factor for growth in the insurance market29
and to be correlated with the probability of health insurance coverage.30 The speed of
China’s economic growth has caused a boom in the insurance market. Chinese insurance
companies’ optimistic expectations of this situation continuing may stimulate them to
engage in risky behaviour. We use the growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) as a
proxy for the macroeconomy.
In addition, market competition affects insurers’ risk-taking strategies. In a monopoly or
oligarchical monopoly market, insurers ﬁnd it much easier to obtain proﬁt and are less
willing to take risks. In a competitive market, insurers have to develop strategies for
retaining market share, and those facing tough competition may take risky measures such
as promising unrealistically high commissions to agents or selling products on the basis of
misleading information. The Herﬁndahl index is used as a proxy for market competition
and is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all insurers writing
business in the present year.
The regression model used to examine the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking is as
follows:
Rit ¼ c + βGF +Xitα + uit; (1)
where i denotes cross-sections; t denotes time-periods with i= 1, 2,…,N; t= 1, 2,…, T; c is the
intercept, α isK×1; Xit is the it-th observation onK control variables; and Rit are the measures of
risks. GF is a dummy variable used as a proxy for the establishment of guaranty funds.
29 Outreville (1996).
30 Cawley and Simon (2003).
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The Chinese Guaranty Fund Regulation was implemented in 2005. Therefore, as a binary
variable, GF takes the value of one for the years from 2005, and zero for the years before.
Accounting risk measures are used in this study, including total, underwriting and
leverage risk. Total risk is deﬁned as the standard deviation of the return on assets, following
Ho et al.17 The measures of underwriting risks for PL and LH insurers are different.
The proportion of premiums written in the health business can be used as a proxy for the
underwriting risk for LH insurance ﬁrms, following Cheng et al.18 Health products are prone
to more uncertainties than other products offered by an LH insurance company since life
insurance, annuities and pensions can be predicted more reliably based on mortality tables.
The proxy for the underwriting risk of PL insurers is the standard deviation of the loss ratio.
The loss ratio is calculated by the sum of total losses incurred (paid and reserved) in claims
plus adjustment expenses divided by total premiums earned. Insurers that consistently
experience high loss ratios may be in bad ﬁnancial health. Finally, the leverage risk is deﬁned
as one minus the surplus-to-asset ratio.
These three risk measures are used to depict the risks faced by an insurer from different
perspectives. The underwriting risk refers to the risk of loss on underwriting activity.
The leverage risk is related to the default risk17 It should be noted that the appropriate
leverage ratio is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Larger insurers have more diversiﬁed portfolios and are likely
to be able to afford higher leverage. Return on assets shows how efﬁcient an insurer is at
managing and using its assets to generate earnings. Underwriting proﬁt and investment
earnings are the two sources of net income. The standard deviation of the return on assets
gives a picture of an insurer’s comprehensive risk, while the underwriting and leverage risks
measure speciﬁc risks arising from certain aspects of its operations.
Government shareholding and risk taking
The DID model is used to examine the difference in the effect of guaranty funds on risk
taking by state-controlled and foreign insurers. DID is a quasi-experimental technique that
measures the effect of a treatment at a given period in time. In contrast to a within-subject
estimate of the treatment effect, which measures the difference in an outcome before and
after treatment, or a between-subjects estimate of the treatment effect, which measures the
difference in an outcome between the treatment and control groups, the DID estimator
represents the within-subject, pre- and post-treatment differences for the treatment and
control groups.
The model is speciﬁed as follows:
Rit ¼ c + β1GF + β2GS + β3GF*GS +Xitα + uit; (2)
where i denotes cross-sections; t denotes time-periods with i= 1, 2,…, N; t= 1, 2,…, T; c
is the intercept; α is K×1; Xit is the it-th observation on K control variables; and Rit are the
measures of risks. GF is a dummy variable used as a proxy for the establishment of
guaranty funds. The dummy variable GS is used as a proxy for ownership structure. GS is
zero for a state-controlled insurer and one for a foreign insurance company.
In this study, state-controlled insurers are regarded as the control and foreign insurers as
the treatment group. State-controlled insurers have always been protected, whether by
implicit or explicit guaranty funds. Foreign insurers have experienced a shift from nothing to
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explicit protection. The latter are therefore more likely to respond to the establishment of the
explicit guaranty fund by taking risks than are their state-controlled counterparts.
Data
Our sample consists of 15 PL and 13 LH insurers approved to write business in China at the
end of 2001. At that time, there were a total of 16 PL insurers and 15 LH insurance ﬁrms
operating business. In the LH insurance market, we exclude Xinjiang Jianshe Bintuan
Company from our sample, for it was restructured as China United Property Insurance
Company and withdrew from this sector in 2006. The PingAn Insurance Company, as a
group, is excluded from both the PL and LH insurance markets because no separate balance
sheet is provided for the respective segments of its business. Table 1 shows all the insurance
companies approved to write business in China in 2001. Our sample includes all of them
except for the three insurers whose names are shown in italics.
The data spans the period from 2001 to 2007. We choose this period to enable a relatively
consistent phase in the development of the insurance industry. Firstly, China became a
member of the WTO in 2001. With the implementation of China’s commitment to the WTO,
regional and business restrictions were removed, resulting in a more evenly competitive
market for foreign companies than before. Secondly, the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008 signiﬁcantly
affected the Chinese insurance market and its regulation. China’s insurance regulators
increased their supervision, and insurance companies have actively implemented conserva-
tive risk management strategies since then.
The market shares of the PL insurers in the sample are all over 70 per cent whereas those
of the LH insurers are around 70 per cent during the sample period (see Table 2).
The data comes from the China Insurance Year Books, China Insurance Regulatory
Commission and the China Statistical Yearbooks. We measure the standard deviation of the
return on assets and loss ratios by using ﬁve-year rolling period data. Some measures therefore
include information obtained before the establishment of explicit guaranty funds. For example,
the risk measure for 2007 is based on information extending back to 2003. Our data is also an
unbalanced panel, given that a few of the foreign insurance companies are newcomers to the
market. The total and underwriting risks of an insurer cannot be measured in 2001 and 2002 by
using ﬁve-year rolling period data when that ﬁrm was only established in 1999.
As is well known, the error terms of a panel analysis are likely to be correlated over time
and across ﬁrms, and unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc components are likely to be correlated with
observable ﬁrm characteristics or explanatory variables. This could lead to biased coefﬁcient
estimates. In our speciﬁcation of the error components, we take the disturbances as:
uit ¼ ui + vit;
where ui are cross-section-speciﬁc components and vit are remainder effects.
We conduct a heteroscedasticity test of the sample data, given that larger insurance ﬁrms
are expected to take fewer risks. The result of the White test shows that heteroscedasticity is
present. The Hausman test reveals that the ﬁxed-effects model is preferred.
A correlation test of independent variables is also conducted. We exclude some highly
correlated control variables from our models. However, the omission of variables may result
in an endogeneity problem. We discuss the endogeneity issues of the ownership structure
and risk taking further below.
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The Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test is used to examine the potential endogeneity issue
of the ownership structure variable. In the ﬁrst stage, the variable is regressed against all the
exogenous and instrumental variables. In the second stage, the residual of the endogenous
variable is added to the original regression model. If the coefﬁcient of the residual of
ownership structure variable is statistically signiﬁcant, that variable can be considered
endogenous.
We choose the location of the ﬁrm’s head ofﬁce as the instrumental variable for ownership
structure. Most Chinese insurance companies have their head ofﬁce in either Beijing or
Shanghai. Beijing is the political centre of China, while Shanghai is an international ﬁnancial
city. The resource dependence theory (RDT) proposes that external resources are an
important tenet of both the strategic and tactical management of any company. Organisations
depend on resources, and these are ultimately found in the external environment. We ﬁnd
that most state-controlled insurers have their head ofﬁces in Beijing, while most foreign
insurers choose Shanghai. LC is denoted as an instrumental variable for GS and deﬁned as
the location of the head ofﬁce when the insurance company was set up. LC is zero if the head
ofﬁce was located in Beijing at the time of establishment, and one if the head ofﬁce was
located in Shanghai or elsewhere.
Table 1 Companies approved to underwrite insurance in China in 2001
PL insurance market LH insurance market
PICC China Life
Paciﬁc Property Paciﬁc Life











Winterthur (Switzerland)-Shanghai China GMG





Data source: China Insurance Yearbook 2002.
Table 2 Market shares of sample PL and LH insurers 2001–2007
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
PL insurers 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.83 0.77 0.76
LH insurers 0.72 0.76 0.71 0.73 0.69 0.72 0.70
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The endogeneity test results show that ownership structure is an endogenous variable.
Then, we test the strength of the instrumental variable LC and ﬁnd that the F-statistics against
the null hypothesis (that the excluded instruments are irrelevant in the ﬁrst-stage regression)
are all larger than 10, which validates the correlation of ownership structure and instrumental
variable. The assumption that the instrument is not correlated with the error term is not
testable in our exactly identiﬁed model. However, it may reasonably be inferred that the
location of the head ofﬁce when an insurance company was established has little relationship
with its subsequent risk-taking behaviour.
Next, we use the two-stage least square (2SLS) method to address the endogeneity issue in
Model 2.
In a DID model, the validity of the DID estimator is based on the assumption that the
underlying trend in the outcome variable will be the same for both treatment and control
groups. We test the Ashenfelter dip of the data to ensure the validity of our DID model.
In our study, guaranty funds are nationwide and each insurer is assessed. Therefore, the
potential bias caused by Ashenfelter’ dip is nonexistent.31
We ﬁrst regress Models 1 and 2 using the pooled sample. Model 1 uses the ﬁxed-effects
model and Model 2 is the 2SLS regression. The heteroscedasticity-robust t-test is applied.
Then, we separate the pooled sample into PL and LH subsamples to enable the measurement
of the underwriting risks of each type of insurer, and regress the models individually.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of major variables depicting the individual
properties of insurers. Panel A shows the results of the mean test between state-controlled
and foreign insurers in the PL insurance market. We ﬁnd that state-controlled PL insurance
companies are signiﬁcantly different from foreign ones in terms of ﬁrm age, size, level of
reinsurance, diversiﬁcation of products and geographic areas, and percentage of long-tail
product lines. A lower level of reinsurance and higher concentration on certain product
lines imply that state-controlled insurers are more inclined to take risks than their foreign
counterparts. However, geographic diversiﬁcation and a lower percentage of long-tail
product lines imply the opposite. It is therefore difﬁcult to assess the difference in risk
preference between state-controlled and foreign insurers. Secondly, it is found that state-
controlled PL insurers have a signiﬁcantly higher level of total risk and leverage risk than
foreign peers.
Panel B shows the results of the mean test between state-controlled and foreign LH
insurers. Like the PL insurance market, state-controlled LH insurance companies are
signiﬁcantly different from foreign ﬁrms in terms of ﬁrm age, size, level of reinsurance,
diversiﬁcation of products and geographic areas, and premium growth rates. Foreign insurers
use less reinsurance, have a higher concentration in geographic areas, and are more
diversiﬁed in terms of product lines. In addition, the leverage risk level of state-controlled
LH insurers is signiﬁcantly higher than that of foreign insurance ﬁrms. We believe the
governance challenges faced by state-controlled insurers and the implicit guaranty funds
possibly provide an explanation for the differences in risks between state-controlled and
foreign insurers both in PL and LH insurance markets.
31 The “Ashenfelter dip” refers to the fact that the earnings of participants in training programmes tend to decline
just before they start, so the “before-after” estimator would overestimate the effect of the programme
(Ashenfelter, 1978).
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Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation coefﬁcients of all independent variables. We ﬁnd
that LNSIZE (ﬁrm size), HHI (Herﬁndahl index), LONGTAIL (percentage of long-tail
product lines) and GHHI (geographic Herﬁndahl index) are highly correlated with each other
in the PL insurance market, and ﬁrm size, HHI and BHHI have high correlations with the
other variables in the LH insurance market. These control variables are excluded from our
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of major variables
Panel A: PL insurance market
Variable State-controlled insurers Foreign insurers Mean test
N Mean Standard deviation N Mean Standard deviation Difference Sig.
Age 56 17.5000 15.2654 41 8.2593 2.9819 9.2407 0.0020
LnSize 56 8.9784 1.3551 41 6.0733 0.6782 2.9051 0.0000
RR 56 0.2340 0.1068 41 0.3449 0.2415 −0.1109 0.0340
BHHI 56 0.5524 0.1288 41 0.3385 0.0886 0.2138 0.0000
GHHI 56 0.1209 0.1033 41 0.9091 0.2049 −0.7883 0.0000
LONGTAIL 56 0.0238 0.0138 41 0.2512 0.1801 −0.2274 0.0000
PGR 56 0.4057 0.6962 41 1.7230 6.6404 −1.3173 0.2690
Total risk 56 0.0648 0.0483 41 0.0449 0.0457 0.0198 0.1000
Underwriting risk 56 0.1519 0.0958 41 0.2170 0.2106 −0.0651 0.1470
Leverage risk 56 0.8380 0.1450 41 0.4374 0.1105 0.4006 0.0000
Panel B: LH insurance market
Variable State-controlled insurers Foreign insurers Mean test
N Mean Standard deviation N Mean Standard deviation Difference Sig.
Age 28 18.1667 17.6775 47 6.7857 3.1781 11.3810 0.0050
LnSize 28 10.4929 2.1809 47 7.6804 1.6651 2.8126 0.0000
RR 28 0.0339 0.0573 47 0.0104 0.0115 0.0235 0.0590
BHHI 28 0.5654 0.1324 47 0.5458 0.1026 0.0196 0.0790
GHHI 28 0.3011 0.3640 47 0.5689 0.3360 −0.2679 0.0080
PGR 28 0.1536 0.1591 47 0.6811 0.8176 −0.5275 0.0020
Total risk 28 0.0222 0.0244 47 0.0249 0.0149 −0.0027 0.6250
Underwriting risk 28 0.0904 0.0514 47 0.0787 0.0565 0.0017 0.4430
Leverage risk 28 0.9292 0.0551 47 0.8315 0.1573 0.0977 0.0040
Notes: AGE is the number of years since an insurer was established. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total
asset of insurance ﬁrms. RR is the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus
reinsurance assumed. BHHI (business line Herﬁndahl index) measures the line concentration, which is deﬁned as
∑(PWi/TPW)2 where PWi is the value of net written premiums in line i and TPW is the insurer’s total net written
premiums. GHHI (geographic Herﬁndahl index) is a measure of geographic concentration deﬁned as∑(PWi/TPW)2,
where PWi is the value of net written premiums in province i and TPW is the insurer’s total net written premiums.
LONGTAIL (percentage of long-tail lines) is calculated by the premiums of long-tail lines divided by total net
written premiums. PGR is the growth rate of net premiums written by insurers. Total risk is deﬁned as the standard
deviation of the return on assets. The proportion of premiums written in the health business is used as a proxy for the
underwriting risk for LH insurance ﬁrms, and the standard deviation of the loss ratio is a proxy for the underwriting
risk of PL insurers. The loss ratio is calculated as the sum of total losses incurred (paid and reserved) in claims plus
adjustment expenses divided by the total premiums earned. Leverage risk is deﬁned as one minus the surplus-to-
asset ratio.
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Table 4 Correlations of independent variables
PL insurance market
GF GS AGE BHHI GHHI LNSIZE RR PGR LONGTAIL GDP HHI
GF 1.0000 0.0000 0.1014 0.1098 −0.0405 0.2297 −0.0776 −0.1678 0.0296 0.4247 −0.8740
GS 1.0000 −0.3665 −0.4901 0.9147 −0.8023 0.3303 0.1297 0.6464 0.0000 0.0000
AGE 1.0000 0.1683 −0.4034 0.6459 −0.1578 −0.0373 −0.2785 0.0186 −0.1078
BHHI 1.0000 −0.6530 0.4252 −0.4538 −0.0209 −0.4758 0.0767 −0.0912
GHHI 1.0000 −0.8282 0.2143 0.1332 0.5737 0.0043 0.0446
LNSIZE 1.0000 −0.2570 −0.1327 0.5673 0.0815 −0.2550
RR 1.0000 0.0780 0.2958 −0.0561 0.0671
PGR 1.0000 −0.0670 −0.1133 0.2429




GF GS AGE BHHI GHHI LNSIZE RR PGR GDP HHI
GF 1.0000 0.0000 0.0922 0.1204 −0.1819 0.1852 0.0818 −0.0929 0.1545 −0.8103
GS 1.0000 −0.4272 −0.7902 0.3672 −0.5889 −0.2357 0.2708 0.0000 0.0000
AGE 1.0000 0.2030 −0.4314 0.6655 −0.0638 −0.1650 0.0169 −0.0865
BHHI 1.0000 −0.4139 −0.8342 −0.4016 −0.0301 0.0893 −0.0782
GHHI 1.0000 −0.9009 −0.0175 0.1327 −0.0846 0.1824
LNSIZE 1.0000 −0.0136 −0.2273 0.0573 −0.1741
RR 1.0000 −0.0940 −0.0373 −0.0429
PGR 1.0000 0.0821 0.0072
GDP 1.0000 −0.2122
HHI 1.0000
Notes: GF is a dummy variable for guaranty funds that takes the value of one following the establishment of explicit funds in 2005, and zero otherwise. GS is a dummy variable
for insurers' governance structure that is zero for state-controlled insurers and one for foreign ﬁrms. AGE is the number of years since an insurer was established.BHHI (business
line Herﬁndahl index) measures product line concentration, deﬁned as∑(PWi/TPW)2, where PWi is the value of net written premiums in line i and TPW is the insurer’s total net
written premiums. GHHI (geographic Herﬁndahl index) is a measure of geographic concentration deﬁned as∑(PWi/TPW)2 where PWi is the net written premiums in province
i and TPW is the insurer’s total net written premiums. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets of insurance ﬁrms. RR is the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the
sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed. PGR is the growth rate of net premiums written by insurers. LONGTAIL (percentage of long-tail lines) is calculated
by the premiums of long-tail lines divided by total net written premiums. GDP is the growth rate of GDP. HHI is the Herﬁndahl index of the PL or LH insurance market and is






















models to address the problem of multicollinearity. We use variance inﬂation factors (VIFs)
to test for multicollinearity among the independent variables in the regression design. The
VIFs of all independent variables in the regressions are lower than 5, so the regression results
are not adversely affected by multicollinearity.
Empirical results
We investigate the risk-subsidy and monitoring hypotheses of guaranty funds and the
difference in their effect on risk taking by state-controlled and foreign insurers. First, pooled
samples are used to examine the overall effect. Then, to take into account the difference in the
characteristics of PL and LH insurers, we examine Models 1 and 2 for each market separately.
Finally, we present a summary of the empirical results for all three markets.
Pooled market
The empirical results showing the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking using the pooled
sample are presented in Table 5.32 Model 1 investigates the effect of guaranty funds on risk
taking by pooled insurers. In the pooled sample, the guaranty funds variable has a signiﬁcant and
negative relationship with both total and leverage risk. The risks of insurers decrease following
the establishment of guaranty funds. These results support Hypothesis 2. Firm age is negatively
related to total risk, but positively to leverage risk. Insurers with a longer history become more
sophisticated and have the capacity to maintain a stable operation. The reinsurance ratio has a
signiﬁcant and negative relationship with both total and leverage risk. A higher growth rate of
premiums leads to a higher level of both risk types. The growth rate of GDP has a positive
relationship with total risk, but a negative one with leverage risk. An explanation for this is that
the rapid growth of an economy creates more investment opportunities for insurers. In particular,
they are attracted to investing more in stocks as the securities market booms, which leads to a
higher total risk. On the other hand, the Chinese ﬁnancial industry has been gradually opened up
to the domestic private sector. It has become easier for insurance companies to access capital.
Hence, the average level of the leverage ratio tends to decline.
Model 2 investigates the difference in the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking between
state-controlled and foreign insurers. It can be seen that total and leverage risk both decrease
following the establishment of guaranty funds. State-controlled insurers have signiﬁcantly
lower total risk than their foreign competitors. Foreign insurers are more risk-driven than
state-controlled insurers following the establishment of guaranty funds, which supports
Hypothesis 3. The establishment of guaranty funds provides protection against excessive risk
taking by foreign insurers. Firm age has a negative relationship with total and leverage risk.
Reinsurance signiﬁcantly reduces insurers’ leverage risk. Insurers with higher growth rate of
premiums have more leverage risk. The growth rate of GDP has a positive relationship with
an insurer’s total risk and a negative relationship with leverage risk.
32 In the pooled sample, the relationship between guaranty funds and the underwriting risks of insurers is not
tested for the distinct measures of underwriting risks that are adopted for PL and LH insurers.
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The PL insurance market
The empirical results showing the relationship between guaranty funds and risk taking by
PL insurers are presented in Table 6. We ﬁnd that guaranty funds are negatively related to
total, underwriting and leverage risk. This provides evidence for the monitoring hypoth-
esis. That is, monitoring from stakeholders and regulators dominates the risk incentive to
insurers following the establishment of guaranty funds. Firm age has a negative relation-
ship with total and underwriting risk, but a positive one with leverage risk. We observe that
the business Herﬁndahl index is positively related to total and underwriting risk. Higher
concentration on product lines tends to increase risk levels. The reinsurance ratio has a
negative relationship with risks. Reinsurance signiﬁcantly reduces insurers’ total, under-
writing and leverage risk. The premium growth rate is positively related to total and
leverage risk. The growth rate of GDP is positively related to total and underwriting risk,
but negatively to leverage risk, which is consistent with the results of the pooled market
sample.
Table 5 Regression results of guaranty funds on risk taking by pooled insurers
Variable Total risk Leverage risk
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob.
C 0.1270 0.0000 −0.0819 0.0000 −0.5415 0.0000 2.1836 0.0000
GF −0.0010*** 0.0000 −0.0029*** 0.0000 −0.0149*** 0.0000 −0.0132** 0.0305
GS −0.0362*** 0.0000 0.0625 0.3437
GF×GS 0.0105*** 0.0000 −0.0422 0.1031
AGE −0.0205*** 0.0000 −0.0004* 0.0570 0.2913*** 0.0000 −0.0039*** 0.0080
RR −0.0272*** 0.0005 −0.0238 0.1328 −0.2743*** 0.0000 −0.3528*** 0.0000
PGR 0.0004*** 0.0000 0.0002 0.5247 0.0059*** 0.0000 0.0053* 0.0587
GDP 1.4707*** 0.0000 0.6000*** 0.0000 −19.4226*** 0.0000 −6.1533*** 0.0000
R2 0.9579 0.9146 0.9750 0.9181
Adjusted R2 0.9402 0.9055 0.9648 0.9094
F-statistic 56.1667*** 101.2587*** 96.1269*** 99.8705***
Durbin–Watson stat 2.08 2.0447 1.80 1.6277
Observations 172 172 172 172
Notes:Model 1 examines the effect of explicit guaranty funds on risk taking by pool insurers. Model 2 examines the
difference in the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking between state-controlled and foreign insurers in a pooled
market. C is the intercept of the regression models. GF is a dummy variable for guaranty funds that takes the value of
one following the establishment of explicit guaranty funds in 2005, and zero otherwise. GS is a binary dummy
variable denoting the governance structure of insurers. State-controlled insurers are the control group for which GS
equals zero, while foreign insurers are the treatment group for which GS is set to one. AGE denotes the number of
years since an insurer was established. RR is the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums
written plus reinsurance assumed. PGR is the growth rate of net premiums written by insurers. GDP is the growth
rate of GDP. Total risk is deﬁned as the standard deviation of return on assets. Leverage risk is deﬁned as one minus
the surplus-to-assets ratio.
Model 1 is a ﬁxed-effects model. Model 2 uses 2SLS regression. The location of the ﬁrm’s head ofﬁce at the time of
establishment is used as the instrumental variable to represent the ownership structure variable GS. Heteroscedas-
ticity-robust t-test is used.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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Table 7 shows the results of Model 2, which investigates the difference in the effect of
guaranty funds on risk taking for state-controlled and foreign insurers in the PL market.
The underwriting risk is negatively related to the variable representing guaranty funds.
State-controlled PL insurers have higher levels of total and leverage risk than
foreign insurers, while the latter take on more underwriting risk. In terms of the inﬂuence
of ownership structure on the effect of funds on risk taking, we ﬁnd that foreign PL
insurers are more risk-driven for leverage risk, which supports Hypothesis 3. However,
the results for underwriting risk suggest that state-controlled insurers are more risk-driven
following the establishment of guaranty funds. One possible explanation for this is the
complete removal of restrictions on product lines and geographic spread in 2006, which
contributed to the business and geographic diversiﬁcation of foreign insurance companies
and led, in turn, to a decrease in the underwriting risk. Meanwhile, the underwriting
quality of state-controlled insurers was declining after several years of the implementation
of a “volume expansion” strategy. The combined effect of these events may explain the
ﬁnding that state-controlled insurers are more risk-driven in terms of underwriting
behaviour.
We observe that the reinsurance ratio is negatively related to the total and leverage risk,
consistent with expectations. Premium growth rate is positively related to underwriting and
Table 6 Regression results of guaranty funds on risk taking by PL insurers
Variable Total risk Underwriting risk Leverage risk
Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob.
C 0.1294 0.0000 0.6278 0.0001 −0.0540 0.3411
GF −0.0036*** 0.0000 −0.0932*** 0.0000 −0.0088*** 0.0040
AGE −0.0257*** 0.0000 −0.1574*** 0.0005 0.1446*** 0.0000
BHHI 0.0908*** 0.0000 0.4773*** 0.0000 −0.1473 0.3594
RR −0.0185*** 0.0039 −0.1248*** 0.0000 −0.2887*** 0.0000
PGR 0.0002*** 0.0023 0.0012 0.5341 0.0059*** 0.0000
GDP 1.9018*** 0.0000 11.8146*** 0.0003 −8.7228*** 0.0000
R2 0.9673 0.7298 0.9695
Adjusted R2 0.9505 0.5913 0.9538
F-statistic 57.6482*** 5.2682*** 61.9576***
Durbin–Watson stat 2.0347 2.0161 2.1451
Observations 97 97 97
Notes: The table shows the regression results of Model 1 that examines the effect of explicit guaranty funds on risk
taking by PL insurers. C is the intercept of the regression models. GF is a dummy variable for guaranty funds that
takes the value of one following their establishment in 2005, and zero otherwise. AGE is the number of years since
an insurer was established. BHHI (business line Herﬁndahl index) measures the line concentration, which is deﬁned
as ∑(PWi/TPW)2 where PWi is the value of the net written premiums in line i and TPW is the insurer’s total net
written premiums. RR is the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus
reinsurance assumed. PGR is the growth rate of the net premiums written by insurers. GDP is the growth rate of the
GDP. Total risk is deﬁned as the standard deviation of the return on assets. The standard deviation of the loss ratio is
a proxy for the underwriting risk of PL insurers. The loss ratio is calculated as the sum of total losses incurred (paid
and reserved) in claims plus adjustment expenses divided by the total premiums earned. Leverage risk is deﬁned as
one minus the surplus-to-asset ratio.
All models are ﬁxed-effects models. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels,
respectively.
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leverage risk. The growth rate of GDP is also positively related to total, underwriting and
leverage risk.
The LH insurance market
The empirical analysis of the relationship between guaranty funds and risk taking by LH
insurance companies is shown in Table 8. Total and underwriting risk have a signiﬁcant and
negative relationship with guaranty funds. LH insurance companies’ risks decrease following
the establishment of these funds. These results are evidence for the monitoring hypothesis, as
for the PL insurance market. There is no signiﬁcant negative relationship between leverage risk
and guaranty funds. Firm age is found to be positively related to leverage risk. GHHI is
positively related to total risk and negatively to leverage risk. The reinsurance ratio has a
signiﬁcant negative relationship with both total and leverage risk. The premium growth rate is
Table 7 Differences in the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking between state-controlled and foreign
PL insurers
Variable Total risk Underwriting risk Leverage risk
Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob.
C −0.0588 0.5513 0.0631 0.2981 0.9172 0.0000
GF −0.0019 0.5629 −0.0322** 0.0338 −0.0068 0.2609
GS −0.0645* 0.0970 0.1203** 0.0190 −0.4844*** 0.0000
GF×GS 0.0070 0.4000 −0.1554**** 0.0000 0.0364** 0.0189
AGE −0.0019*** 0.0102 −0.0020*** 0.0026 −0.0017*** 0.0002
BHHI 0.0046 0.5515 0.0705 0.6358 −0.1214 0.2378
RR −0.0738*** 0.0024 −0.0382 0.3822 −0.1958** 0.0302
PGR 0.0000 0.7562 0.0025* 0.0684 0.0224*** 0.0000
GDP 0.9808** 0.0318 0.8292*** 0.0083 0.7340*** 0.0000
R2 0.9512 0.3479 0.9334
Adjusted R2 0.9387 0.2456 0.9163
F-statistic 77.3256*** 5.5575*** 56.1244***
Durbin–Watson stat 2.1491 1.4968 1.9375
Observations 97 97 97
Notes: The table shows the results of Model 2 that investigates the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking by PL
insurers with different ownership structures. C is the intercept of the regression models. GF is a dummy variable for
guaranty funds that takes the value of one following their establishment in 2005, and zero otherwise. GS is a binary
dummy variable denoting the governance structure of insurers; state-controlled insurers are the control for which GS
equals zero, while the foreign insurers are the treatment group for which GS is one. AGE is the number of years since
an insurer was established. BHHI (business Herﬁndahl index) measures the line concentration, which is deﬁned as
∑(PWi/TPW)2, where PWi is the value of the net written premiums in line i and TPW is the insurer’s total net written
premiums. RR is the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance
assumed. PGR is the growth rate of the net premiums written by insurers. GDP is the growth rate of the GDP.
Total risk is deﬁned as the standard deviation of the return on assets. The standard deviation of the loss ratio is a
proxy for the underwriting risk of PL insurers. The loss ratio is calculated by the sum of total losses incurred (paid
and reserved) in claims plus adjustment expenses divided by the total premiums earned. Leverage risk is deﬁned as
one minus the surplus-to-asset ratio.
2SLS regression is used. The location of the ﬁrm’s head ofﬁce at the time of establishment is used as the instrumental
variable for the ownership structure variable GS. Heteroscedasticity-robust t test is used. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent
statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
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negatively related to underwriting and leverage risk. The LH insurers’ premiums stems mainly
from life insurance products, such as participating insurance. Hence, the ratio of premiums
written for their health insurance products declines even though the growth rate of their total
written premiums increases. The growth rate of GDP is negatively linked to the leverage risk, as
also observed in the pooled and PL insurance markets.
Table 9 sets out the empirical results of Model 2, looking at the different effect of guaranty
funds on risk taking between state-controlled and foreign LH insurers. It can be seen that
both the total and underwriting risk of LH insurers decreases with the establishment of
guaranty funds, supporting Hypothesis 1. Foreign LH insurers have a higher total risk than
state-controlled insurers. Following the establishment of guaranty funds, foreign LH insurers
become more risk-driven in terms of total and leverage risk, providing evidence for
Hypothesis 3. We observe that ﬁrm age is negatively related to underwriting and leverage
risk, which is consistent with the results from the PL insurance market. GHHI has a positive
relationship to total risk. The reinsurance ratio is negatively related to leverage risk, as also
observed in the pooled and PL insurance markets. The growth rate of premiums has a
positive relationship with total risk and a negative one with underwriting risk. The growth
rate of GDP is positively linked to total risk, but negatively to leverage risk, again as found
for the pooled insurance market.
Table 8 Regression results of guaranty funds on risk taking by LH insurers
Variable Total risk Underwriting risk Leverage risk
Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob.
C 0.0268 0.0000 0.0365 0.3483 −0.1721 0.5230
GF −0.0071*** 0.0000 −0.0291*** 0.0000 −0.0054 0.6649
AGE 0.0019 0.4149 −0.0063 0.5019 0.3281*** 0.0001
GHHI 0.0100** 0.0118 0.0018 0.9086 −0.1726** 0.0032
RR −0.0719*** 0.0006 0.0295 0.3118 −0.4299** 0.0236
PGR −0.0002 0.9134 −0.0100*** 0.0000 −0.0283* 0.0542
GDP −0.2512 0.1699 1.1034 0.1095 −23.2025*** 0.0001
R2 0.8631 0.9441 0.8393
Adjusted R2 0.7885 0.9136 0.7517
F-statistic 11.5616*** 30.9469*** 9.5782***
Durbin–Watson stat 1.9596 1.7778 1.7182
Observations 75 75 75
Notes: The table shows the regression results of Model 1 that examines the effect of explicit guaranty funds on risk
taking by LH insurers. C is the intercept of the regression models. GF is a dummy variable for guaranty funds that
takes the value of one following their establishment in 2005 and zero otherwise. AGE is the number of years since an
insurer was established. GHHI (geographic Herﬁndahl index) measures the geographic concentration of business,
deﬁned as∑(PWi/TPW)2, where PWi is the value of net written premiums in province i and TPW is the insurer’s total
net written premiums. RR is the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus
reinsurance assumed. PGR is the growth rate of the net premiums written by insurers. GDP is the growth rate of
GDP.
Total risk is deﬁned as the standard deviation of the returns on asset. The proportion of premiums written in the
health business is used as a proxy for the underwriting risk, following Cheng et al. (2011). Leverage risk is deﬁned
as one minus the surplus-to-asset ratio.
All models are ﬁxed-effects models. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels,
respectively.
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Summary of main empirical results
So far, we have examined the risk-subsidy, monitoring and ownership structure hypotheses
by using samples drawn from the Chinese insurance industry. Here, we draw out the most
signiﬁcant empirical results from Models 1 and 2 to draw our conclusions.
Table 10 summarises the key results from Tables 5–9. Panel A shows that, following the
establishment of guaranty funds, insurers took fewer risks whether we look at the pooled
market or the PL or LH segments. The results favour the monitoring hypothesis and meet the
expectations of policymakers. Chinese guaranty funds with their pre-assessment mechanism
provide only a small risk incentive that can be offset by stakeholder monitoring. In practice,
pre-assessment has proven to be an alternative to mitigating the risk-subsidy incentive to
insurers. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance
in the EU has signiﬁcantly reduced banks’ risk taking.28
Table 9 Difference in the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking between state-controlled and foreign
LH insurers
Variable Total risk Underwriting risk Leverage risk
Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob. Coefﬁcient Prob.
C −0.0033 0.5566 0.0465 0.6354 1.4707 0.0000
GF −0.0017* 0.0568 −0.0205* 0.0219 0.0014 0.7054
GS 0.0022** 0.0460 −0.0003 0.9963 −0.0036 0.4957
GF×GS 0.0076*** 0.0000 −0.0121 0.4373 0.0251*** 0.0000
AGE 0.0000 0.4543 −0.0011* 0.0873 −0.0024*** 0.0000
GHHI 0.0164*** 0.0000 0.0312 0.6366 −0.0549 0.1201
RR −0.0401 0.2483 0.0111 0.5494 −0.2397*** 0.0000
PGR 0.0027*** 0.0020 −0.0107*** 0.0026 −0.0024 0.2407
GDP 0.0839** 0.0481 0.5160 0.2785 −3.5751*** 0.0000
R2 0.8461 0.8957 0.9939
Adjusted R2 0.7983 0.8634 0.9920
F-statistic 16.8714*** 27.6025*** 504.1215***
Durbin–Watson stat 1.8800 2.3705 1.9184
Observations 75 75 75
Notes: The table shows the results of Model 2 that examines the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking by LH
insurers with different ownership structures. C is the intercept of the regression models. GF is a dummy variable for
guaranty funds that takes the value of one following their establishment in 2005 and zero otherwise. GS is a binary
dummy variable denoting the governance structure of insurers; state-controlled insurers are the control for which GS
equals zero, while the foreign insurers are the treatment group for which GS is one. AGE is the number of years since
an insurer was established. GHHI (geographic Herﬁndahl index) measures the geographic concentration, deﬁned as
∑(PWi/TPW)2 where PWi is the values of net written premiums in province i and TPW is the insurer’s total net
written premiums. RR is the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus
reinsurance assumed. PGR is the growth rate of the net premiums written by insurers. GDP is the growth rate of
GDP.
Total risk is deﬁned as the standard deviation of return on assets. The proportion of premiums written in the health
business is used as a proxy for the underwriting risk, following Cheng et al. (2011). Leverage risk is deﬁned as one
minus the surplus-to-asset ratio.
2SLS regression is used. The location of the ﬁrm’s head ofﬁce at the time of establishment is used as the instrumental
variable for the ownership structure variable GS. Heteroscedasticity-robust t test is used. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent
statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively
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The evidence in Panel B suggests the conclusion that foreign insurers are more risk-
driven, which supports Hypothesis 3. With the establishment of guaranty funds, foreign
insurance ﬁrms became covered by a safety net. The shift provided them with more risk
incentives than their state-controlled counterparts, who had always beneﬁted from protection
against takeover and bankruptcy. The regression results of the underwriting risk in the PL
insurance market shows the opposite trend. One explanation for this is that the implementa-
tion of China’s commitment to the WTO has helped the diversiﬁcation of foreign insurers,
leading to a decline in their underwriting risk, while state-controlled insurers have suffered
more from their volume expansion strategy.
From the results of Models 1 and 2, it can be seen that older ﬁrms are prone to take fewer
risks. The more concentrated a ﬁrm is on particular product lines or locations, the more risks
it takes. Reinsurance signiﬁcantly reduces the risk to insurance companies. Generally, the
rapid growth of written premiums tends to increase insurers’ risks. Chinese economic
prosperity has led to a booming ﬁnancial market where insurers tend to invest more in stocks,
resulting in higher total risk. On the other hand, the greater amount of capital available to
insurers helps decrease leverage risk.
Table 10 Summary of signiﬁcant results
Panel A: Model 1 effect of guaranty funds on risk taking by insurers

















GF - - - - - - -
AGE - + - - + +
BHHI
/GHHI + + + -
RR - - - - - - -
PGR + + + + - -
GDP + - + + - -
Panel B: Model 2 difference in the effect of guaranty funds on risk taking between state-controlled and foreign
insurers

















GF - - - - -
GS - - + - +
GF×GS + - + + +
AGE - - - - - - -
BHHI
/GHHI +
RR - - - -
PGR + + + + -
GDP + - + + + + -
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We used an alternative variable, ownership structure, to test the robustness of the results
from Model 2. Ownership structure can be measured in an alternative way as one minus the
percentage of state shareholding, which is a continuous variable. We regressed Model 2
using the continuous variable with all other variables unchanged. The empirical results
showed that the coefﬁcients of the guaranty funds were negative and of the cross term
positive, except for the underwriting risk model in the PL insurance market. Hence, we
believe our results are robust.
Conclusions
In this study, we have examined the risk-subsidy, monitoring and ownership structure
hypotheses for guaranty funds using a sample drawn from the Chinese insurance industry.
Chinese guaranty funds have similar features to those found elsewhere, such as a beneﬁt cap
for policyholders, a ﬂat-rate assessment and the exclusion of reinsurance and overseas
business. However, compared to the American model, Chinese insurance guaranty funds
have the following special features: (1) pre-assessment: the guaranty fund of every insurance
ﬁrm operating in China is assessed annually; (2) separate accumulation: the guaranty funds
collected from each insurer are not pooled before use, with funds accumulated under a
nominal account for each insurer; (3) partial responsibility for peer bankruptcy. When an
insurer gets into ﬁnancial trouble or goes bankrupt, policyholders’ outstanding claims are
ﬁrstly recovered from the funds accumulated in its nominal account. If this does not achieve
full recovery, peers are then responsible for the shortfall, based on their percentage of market
share. The discrepancy in these institutional features results in guaranty funds having
different effects on risk taking by insurers.
We show that the risk taking by Chinese insurance ﬁrms declined following the establishment
of guaranty funds. The ex ante funding system and the separate accumulation of funds made
each insurer responsible for all or most of the cost of taking excessive risks. Pre-assessment
provides little risk incentive to insurers that is easily offset by stakeholders monitoring.
With respect to the governance structure hypothesis, we ﬁnd that foreign insurers are more
risk-driven than their state-controlled counterparts. It is often said that state-controlled insurers
are protected from the two major threats that face private sector corporations: takeover and
bankruptcy. Guaranty funds as a put option have less value to state-controlled insurers.
Meanwhile, foreign insurers have also suffered greatly from ﬁerce competition for market share
and would be expected to take more risky strategies to seize the market. The establishment of
explicit guaranty funds provides protection for such risk taking. Therefore, foreign insurers
demonstrate more risk-driven behaviour following the establishment of guaranty funds.
The results of our study imply that ex ante assessment could be an institutional option for
countries striving to lessen the adverse effects of guaranty funds by adjusting their
institutional features. The availability of ex ante funding can also ensure faster payout and
provide greater reassurance to policyholders. Furthermore, the ﬁnding that foreign insurers
are more risk-driven has implications for the development of Chinese domestic regulation
policy. State-controlled insurers dominate the Chinese insurance market. Insurance regula-
tors have always applied more supervision to state-controlled than foreign insurers. Our
ﬁndings suggest that Chinese regulators should monitor foreign insurers more than they have
done to date in order to create a stable and equally competitive market.
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